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In order to redefine the influence of the energy and technological transitions upon the challenge of
climate change this paper shows that buildings are key agents. This paper discusses the importance of
addressing building energy efficiency in a holistic and transformational way, to avoid that incremental
measures increase the lock-in effect. Moreover, policies should consider a demand-side energy transition,
contrary to today’s discourse, where the supply side and energy production are prominent. Finally, the
most important issues in this energy transition are intergenerational divide and justice.
© 2020 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of KeAi Communications Co., Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).The climate change challenge redefines many aspects of the
energy and technological transitions. There is a need to reconsider
many of the concepts used today by policy-makers and individuals
if we want to change the pathways followed until today. This paper
shows that buildings can be among the most optimal agents to
reach climate goals, considering social, environmental, ethical and
economic aspects. However, if measures to promote building en-
ergy efficiency are not approached from a systemic transition
perspective, but in an incremental, piecemeal way, such an
approach may actually do more harm to reaching climate goals
than advances. Measures encouraging or accepting renovation or
changes that do not achieve all potential energy efficiency means
locking again the potential for the remaining reductions, since
these become very expensive. This also has social consequences (i.e.
energy poverty, health goals), therefore, it is better to fully retrofit a
few buildings than to half retrofit a lot of buildings [1].
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special
Report Global Warming of 1.5 C [2] highlights new constraints in
the energy transition and new agenda in the context of the most
stringent goals of the Paris Agreement. This report presents foura), vorsatzd@ceu.hu (D. Ürge-
vier on behalf of KeAi
ing by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Keillustrative pathways that meet the “well under two degrees” target
of the Paris Agreement [3], representing four different visions of the
future under which the 1.5 C warming cap is met. Fig. 1 presents
these in a breakdown of contributions to global net CO2 emissions
by key mitigation approach (Fig. 1).
The majority of these pathways, but specially P4, rely heavily on
negative emissions, but the success of this concept has already been
questioned, since lock-in of technologies and neglecting embodied
carbon can be a consequence raised by it [4]. In all pathways bio-
energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is considered as
a technology to decrease CO2. But BECCS raises different concerns
[4,5]. The first one is the competition for land with food production
and other land demands such as urbanization; competition for
biomass resources for construction materials, fuel, etc.; implica-
tions in water resources; indirect carbon emissions from life cycle
emissions associated to the supply chain (e.g. 70% of biomass for UK
Drax Power was imported from USA at 36 gCO2/MJ) [5]; embodied
energy in biomass due to processing (pelletization) and transport
[6]; timing, since the “carbon debt” initiated by land conversion to
biomass production cannot offset CO2 savings from displacing coal,
or only over a period of time that is greater than the power plant
lifetime; biodiversity implications; and chemical input re-
quirements. This brings an ethical concern, since pursuing scenario
P4, heavy on BECCS would leave a huge heritage to future
generations.
The only pathway that avoids the planetary scale deployment of
controversial negative emission technologies is P1. This pathway
demonstrates that it is still possible to achieve carbon neutrality by
2050 evenwithout large-scale reliance on these contested emissionAi Communications Co., Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
Fig. 1. Breakdown of contributions to global net CO2 emissions in four illustrative model pathways [2]. Note: AFOLU stands for Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use; BECCS stands for
Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage; CDR stands for Carbon Dioxide Removal.
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mand. Therefore, energy efficiency and demand reduction are
crucial to preserve our flexibility to choose among decarbonisation
options with different side effects, reinforcing this message that
was already substantiated in the Fifth Assessment Report of the
IPCC [7].
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), buildings
and buildings construction sectors are responsible for 36% of global
final energy consumption and 40% of total direct and indirect CO2
emissions [8]. Moreover, the IEA states that the energy demand of
these sectors is still growing due to the improved access to energy
in developing countries, greater ownership and use of energy-
consuming devices, and rapid growth in global buildings floor
area, at nearly 3% per year [8].
So, if a drastic decrease in energy demand is needed, we first
need to understand why this energy demand is still growing and
where in the world each factor is more prominent. The drivers of
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where Eresid and Ecom are the energy use for heating and cooling in
residential and commercial buildings, respectively. The activity
drivers are h, the number of households, and (p/h), the number of
persons living in each household, also called household size for
residential buildings, and GDP, the Gross Domestic Product [2005
US$] for the commercial ones. The use intensity drivers are (A/p),
the floor area [m2] per person for residential buildings and (A/GDP),
the floor area [m2] per GDP, in the commercial ones. Finally, the
energy intensity drivers are (E/A), the energy [kWh] used for
heating or cooling each unit of floor area [m2], also called specific
energy consumption for any building.
Fig. 2 shows that the specific energy consumption in buildings
has decreased in the past and is projected to continue decreasing,
althoughmaybe not at the rate desired. Therefore, other drivers and
factors need to be considered.
One factor that is to be considered is that the floor area per
person is increasing. This may sound odd when today people dwell
in small apartments compared to the past where people were living
in big farms. But another driver analysed in Fig. 2 shows that the
number of persons living in each household is decreasing. This is
due to two reasons. The first one is that when a couple is married or
goes to live together, they usually acquire a household for them and258the children to come, but later on (sometimes no more than about
20 years later) the childrenmove to their own premises, leaving the
parents alone with a big household, and with today’s life expec-
tancy they may live for another 40 years or more! Another reason
for this is divorce. When a couple splits up, they double the living
area changing from one household to two, more if there are chil-
dren involved that live part time with one parent or the other [11].
Divorces may also have an impact to the growth of the number of
households (see Fig. 2) and not only the growth of population as
one may expect. In general, the tendencies of individualisation and
securalisation of societies tend us towards to more people per
household, resulting furthermore from the decreased co-habitation
of multiple generations, as well as general decreases in fertility in
the developed world.
Fig. 2 also shows that the specific energy consumption has been
decreasing and is expected to continue to decrease, but the slope of
this decrease is much smaller than the increase of other drivers
studied. Therefore, again, a dramatic increase in energy demand in
buildings maybewitnessed unless policies keep these trends at bay,
or compensate for these growing trends in the drivers in other
ways.
Recent studies show that, without further climate policies,
global final energy demand from buildings could increase from
116 EJ/yr in 2010 to a range of 120e378 EJ/yr in 2100 [12,13].
Literature show a paradigm shift in buildings energy demand.
Appliances, lighting and space cooling dominate demand, while the
weight of space heating and cooking declines. The importance of
developing countries increases and electricity becomes the main
energy carrier.
Low energy buildings and zero energy buildings are now a
market reality in all climates, in all buildings vintage, and in all
areas of the globe, even in low income regions [14]. An example of
the retrofit of a massive building in a cold climate achieving Passive
House standards is the Vienna Technical University building [15],
which reduced drastically the energy demand to levels where the
small area of PV installed, the energy recovery from waste heat in
the servers and from the lifts is enough to provide all the required
energy. There is also increasing evidence that new zero energy
buildings do not entail measurably higher costs than conventional
new buildings; and deep retrofits pay back well within the lifetime
of the building. As the Fifth Assessment Report demonstrated [16],
the cost of a unit of energy saved has not been larger with the
deepest retrofits than with shallow ones (i.e. those saving only
10e40% heating/cooling energy). In contrast, many other emission
reduction “alternatives” such as BECCS, negative emissions tech-
nologies (NETs), and solar radiation management (SRM) technolo-
gies do not pay back without a carbon price e i.e. energy efficiency
Fig. 2. Trends in the different drivers of energy consumption [9,10] in (a) residential buildings (left: worldwide; right: Europe) and (b) commercial buildings (worldwide).
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With ample evidence that the global building sector could be
turned into a carbon neutral sector at net benefit, with great social
benefits such as energy poverty eradication [17,18], if energy sav-
ings are counted, complemented by a wide range of co-benefits
such as improved equity, social welfare, health, indoor air quality,
comfort, etc. e the importance of a zero energy building sector is
clear. However, there is a great urgency. Every building that is built
or retrofitted to a less ambitious target locks us into a warmer
future. Buildings have an average lifespan of 80e100 years [19], so
each building today built or retrofitted to a less than zero energy
level locks higher emissions in for decades. This lock-in effect was
calculated [20] to result in as much as 80% more building thermal
energy consumption in 2050 than in 2010, even if today’s building
energy efficiency policies are fully implemented. Examples of lock-
in solutions in the built environment risking the 1.5 C scenario are
partial or incremental retrofits incompatible with a systemic deep
retrofit (which means a retrofit achieving more than 80% energy
demand reduction) or the replacement of boilers or other HVAC
equipment before carrying out systemic building retrofits.
Another aspect is that when considering the costs and benefits
of limiting warming to 1.5 C, a limited number of model studies
report wide mitigation costs, but they do not include the benefits of
reducing climate change as well as the trade-offs of mitigation.
Considering that carbon budgets are a simplified way to mea-
sure the additional emissions that can go into the atmosphere, the
IPCC Special Report Global Warming of 1.5 C [2] gives the carbon
budget estimations to 1.5 C global warming measured in global
mean surface temperatures (GMST) with a 50% probability to be
770 remaining GtCO2 vs. the 2200 GtCO2 already spent, which
means that we have 17 years left to stop completely CO2 emissions
(if the measured surface air temperature is used, only 8 years are
left). This shows the urgency of the actions to be taken.
If these actions are not taken, thinking on the ambitious path-
ways such as those in Fig. 1, there is also the consideration of
intergenerational justice: we are leaving the problem to our chil-
dren and grandchildren. Intergenerational equity requires that
future generations have a right to enjoy a good life undisturbed by259the damage our energy systems inflict on the world today, and asks
for the promotion of clean energy solutions that implement envi-
ronmental bonds [21]. However, opting for the pathways that delay
the decarbonisation and rely on very aggressive measures in the
second half of the century implies a serious ethical decision: we are
deferring the challenge of decabonisation to our children and
grandchildren who will be faced with these grand challenges of
having to pay for massive BECCS or other NETs without enjoying
any of the benefits of the fossil fuels that we are burning today to
keep our living standards.
There is an urgency that emphasizes the need of avoiding lock-
in risks. First, transformational solutions are needed, avoiding in-
cremental measures that compromise a clear change. Second,
present mitigation policies may need to be fundamentally
rethought. The authors of this editorial consider that demand-side
energy transitions, that is energy efficiency first, are the funda-
mental basis of a climate neutral future if significant environmental
and other risks are to be avoided. This is contrary to the present
discourse, which often largely equates the energy transition with
the supply side and energy production. Finally, intergenerational
divide and justice have become the most important issues in this
transition.
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